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OFF-FARM WORK BY PARM FAMILIES: SOME EMPIRICAL RESULTS A:ID POLICY IMPLICATIONS* 
Wallace E. Huffman, Iowa State University 
1. Introduction 
The welfare of farm families, even those 
with large farms, is not determined solely by 
their incomes from the farms they operate (USDA 
1976, p. 62). The share of personal income of 
the farm population from nonfarm sources has 
steadily increased from 27 percent in 1950 and 35 
percent in 1960 to so+ percent in the 1970's, ex-
cept for 1973-74 when net farm income rose so 
dramatically.I Moreover, approximately 70 per-
cent of the income2from nonfarm sources is wage and salary income. Thus a large and growing 
shar e of the income of farm families is not from 
farming. 
During the past 25 years there has been a 
greater than 65 percent net decline in the farm 
population and a striking increase in the inte-
gration of farm and nonfarm labor markets. The 
sources of integration are (1) an increasing per-
centage of the farm population in the labor force 
has nonfarm jobs , and (2) an increasing percen-
tage of those who work on farms reside elsewhere. 
Only the first of thes3 changes, however, is ad-
dressed in this paper. The reported occupations 
of resident farm males and females show some of 
the change. In 1950, 75.4 percent of the farm 
resident males and 41 percent of farm resident 
females in the civilian labor force r eported their 
occupation (of the census week) as one of the two 
farm occupations , farmers and farm managers or 
farm laborers and farm foreman (U.S. Dep. Com-
merce). 4 In 1970, these percentages had dropped 
to 50 percent for males and 10 percent for fe-
males. Therefore, nonfarm occupations have shown 
a dramatic increase in frequency of reported oc-
cupation of the farm population. 
Reported off-farm work by farm operators and 
their wives shows another aspect of this change . 
Nationally the percentage of farm operators re-
porting any off-farm work during the census yea r 
rose steadily from 39 percent in 1950 to 54 per-
cent in 1969 (U .S. Dep. Commerce 1973, p. 178). 
Operators working 100 days or more off their 
farms increased from 23 to 40 percent during the 
same period. Perhaps surprisingly, all regions, 
except the Northeast, show a similar rise in the 
participation rates of farm operators in off-farm 
work. Only in the North Central region, however, 
did the number of farmers participating in off-
farm work actually increase as the total number 
of farm operators declined. For farm wives , the 
nonfarm labor force participation rate increased 
from 16 percent in March 1959 to 26 percent in 
March 1971 (U.S. Dep. Labor). 
This paper reports on an economic analysis of 
off-farm work, which is a relatively new topic. 
Lee has sketched a model for allocating farm re-
sources between farm and nonfarm uses , and Polzin 
and MacDonald have published estimates for a 
naive off-farm labor supply model. Some other 
studies are in unpublished form . In this paper, 
a labor supply model provides the theoretical 
framework for the determinants of off-fare labor 
supply of farm family members. The model is simi-
84 
lar to one sketched by Lee. Empirical results 
are reported from fitting off-farm labor supply 
functions for farmers t o 180 pooled observations 
of state averages of farm households grouped by 
age of farm operator. The results yield implica-
tions for agricultural, rural development and 
manpower policies . 
Section 2 presents the labor supply model. 
The data, empirical measures of the variables and 
empirical results are presented in section 3. 
Section 4 contains some policy implications. 
2. A Labor Supply Model 
The labor supply decisions of farm household 
members are viewed most simply as the result of 
household utility maximization s ubject to a human 
time constraint and to an endogenously determined 
income constraint. Household members are assw:ied 
to receive utility or welfare directly or indi-
r ectly (Michael and Becker) from a vector of mei:i-
bers' human consumption time (L), a vector of 
goods purchased in the market (Y ) and a vector 
of factors exogenous to current 1household con-
sumption decisions (Y2) -- age and education of household members and number of household mem-
bers. The utility function is represented as the 
strictly concave function: 
In maximizing utility, the household faces three 
constraints. First, a vec tor of human time en-
dowm.ents of family members (T0 ) is allocated be-
tween farm work (X1), off-farm work (T0 f) and 
consumption time (1) for each member: 
(2) To• xl + Tof + L.s 
Second, household income received from members' 
off-farm work at wage rates W f' net farm income 
(PQ - wl2) and other househo~a income (V) is 
spent on market goods: 
(3) wofTof + PQ - w2x2 + v • plyl 
where P is the price of farm output Q, w2x2 is the total variable cos t of producing farm output, 
and P1 is the price vector for Y1 . The analysis 
assumes that flexible work schedules persist in 
off-farm labor markets, and a family member's 
off-farm wage rate is exogenous to his current 
ouantity of off-farm work, i.e., that there is a 
perfectly elastic demand for his labor. 6 Third, 
the properties of the input output relation of 
the farm output production function restrict the 
potential size of the income-expenditure con-
straint. Farm output is produced from two vec-
tors of inputs. a vector of family members' farm 
labor inputs (X1) and a vector of other variable inputs (X2). Tne production function is repre-
sented as the strictly concave function: 
Equation (4) can, however, be eliminated after it 
is substituted into equation (3) to create the 
new combined constraint: 
Conditions for the optimal quantity of off-
fana work (T
0
f), of the two variable inputs into 
household consumption (L and Y1) and of the two inputs into farm output production (X1 and x2) 
are obtained by maximizing equation (1) subject 
to (2) and (S). For an interior solution, the 
~ime of each household member must be allocated 
such that the marginal value of farm work, of 
consumption time and of off-farm work are equal 
( Le. , Pf1 = u1 J>, = H f where ;>. = the marginal 
ut ility of income).7 ° 
The quantity of off-farm work by household 
embers can be viewed as a residual by subtract-
ing the quantity of consumption time and of farm 
work f r om the human time endowment: 
(6) T - r 0 - L - xl . of 
But the quantities that the household demands o f 
L for household consumption and of x1 for farm production (and of the other endogenous variables) 
a re functions of the exogenous var iables of the 
model Wof ' P1, P, w2, V and Y2, 
( 7) L* • d1 (W0 f ,P1 , P , W2 ,V,Y2) and 
(8) * x -1 dl(Wof ' w2 ,P ), 
cax:1awi < o , ax~/aP > 0). 
After substituting equation (7) and (8) into (6), 
the off- fa rm labor supply function is: 
(9) T:f •To - d1 (W0 f ,P1 , P,W2,V ,Y2) 
- dl(wof'w2,P) 
- dl (Wof'W2 ,P) 
• Sof(Wof'Pl,P,W2,V,Y2). 
But the labor suppl~ function (farm and nonfarm) 
is jus t T0 - L* (•T ), s o the off-farm labor 
supply function is ~lso the difference between 
the labor supply function and the demand func tion 
for family farm labor, i.e., an gxcess supply 
f unction (line 2 of equation 9) . More generally , 
the off- farm labor supply function collapses to 
line 3 of equation (9) . 
Although equation (9) su11m1arizes the func-
tional nature of the off-farm labor supply func-
tion, t he equation does not yield !. priori unam-
biguous signs for directional effects of the exo-
genous variables on off-farm labor supply. The 
pri::ar y reason is the !. priori ambiguous direc -
tional effects of the parameters in the demand 
function for consumption time (or t he supply func-
tion of labor). A change in the off-farm wage 
rate causes pure substitution effects in both 
household consumption and farm production and an 
1nco111e effect that may be opposite in sign . A 
change in the price of other variable farm inputs, 
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e.g., wage rate for hired farm labor, causes a 
pure substitution effect in farm production and 
in income effect in household consumption t hat 
also may be opposite in sign. A change in the 
price of farm output, or of household nonlabor 
income, causes an income effec t that depends on 
t he sign of the income elasticity of demand for 
consumption time. 
Graphical determination of the quantity of 
off-farm labor supply is seen most clearly by 
considering the intersection of the supply and 
demand curves for an individual's labor. The de-
mand curve is the horizontal sullDJlation of the 
farm and off-farm demand curves for his labor, 
and it has a kink at the point where these two 
curves intersect. For exam~le , if the farm de-
mand curve for labor is d0 d in figure 1 and the 
0 0 . 0 ' 
off-farm demand curve for labor is W
0
fdof ' the 
total demand curve is the kinked demand curve 
doAd~f· If the total supply of labor curve is 
SS', equilibrium time allocation occurs ate 
wRe~e the wage rate is W°f; the t o tal quantit? of 
labor suppl ied is QtO; tRe quantity of farm work 
is OX~; and the quan¥ity of off-farm work is 
X~t0 • Thus, the individual is a multiple job 
hol~er at one self employed job and one wage job . 
Alternatively, if the farm demand curve for 
labor shifts to d1di owing say to a rise in the 
expec ted price of farm output and t he off-farm 
demand curve , r7mains at l~fd~f, the total demand 
curve is d1A dof• and it intersects the total 
supply curve S0S~ at e1 , assuming a zero income 
elasticity of labor supply . Equilibrium occurs 
at a marginal value of labor of W', which is 
above the off-farm wage rate ~f • and the total 
supply of labor Ot' is allocated t o farm work. 
At e1 the individu~l is a self-employed "full-
time" farmer , and the marginal value of his time 
is endogenous to the model , i.e., it is not de-
termined by the wage rate in the off-farm labor 
Wage 
rate 
0 
Figure 1. 
t 0 t' 
w w 
d' 
0 
s ' 0 
Labor 
Labor supply and demand. 
market . Thus a ceteris paribus shift to the 
right (left) of the demand curve for an indivi-
dual's farm labor reduces (increases) the probab-
ility and quantity of his off-farm work. (Note a 
reduction occurs only when the quanti ty of off-
farm work is initially positive . ) 
3. The Empirical Analysis 
In the empirical analysis, farmers' off-
farm labor supply is measured by two variables, 
the annual participation rate and the annual 
average days of off-farm work. Empirical mea-
sures of variables suggested by the labor supply 
model as being important determinants of off- farm 
labor supply are derived and used in the empiri-
cal analysis. 
The Data 
The primary data sour ce is the 1964 Census 
of Agriculture (mainly state table 19) . The 
study area is the United States . The 48 contigu-
ous states are collapsed into 45 states by com-
bining New Hampshire and Vermont, Connec ticut and 
Rhode Island, and Delaware and Maryland. The ob-
servations are state averages per farm household 
for farm households grouped by age of farm opera-
tor. There are five different age groups in the 
census: <35, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64 and ~ 65 years 
of age. Because the farm operators 65 years of 
age and older face a very different set of re-
tirement related decisions than do younger opera-
tors, this oldest age group is excluded from the 
regression analysis . The observations for the 
age groups <65 years of age are pooled for a 
total of 180 observations. Because households 
are grouped by age before averages of variables 
are constructed , all farmers used to construct an 
observation are homogeneous with respect to age 
and are very similar with respect to position in 
their life cycle. Furthermore, some of the vari-
ables entering the analysis have a definite age 
pattern, so stratification by age and pooling 
over all age groups is helpful in separating age 
effects from other real effects. 
In the regression analysis, two measures of 
farmers ' off-farm labor supply are to be analyzed. 
They are (1) the annual off-farm participation 
rate, the proportion of farm operators reporting 
off-farm work during 1964, and (2) the annual 
average number of off-farm days worked by opera-
tors in 1964. These two variables measure dif-
ferent aspects of off-farm labor supply. 
Although expected off-farm wage rates seem 
likely to be an important determinant of off-farm 
labor supply, empirically and theoretically sound 
measures of this variable for farmers and for 
other farm household members are scarce. One 
possibility is the marginal expected net (of 
taxes, commuting costs and job related expenses) 
off-farm wage rate. But these data do not exist. 
A more readily available measure is a state aver-
age off-farm wage rate of an age group obtained 
by dividing aggregate off-farm wage and salary 
income by aggregate days worked.9 With this wage 
variable, labor markets are equal in size to a 
state. It is true, however, that these average 
wage rates really apply only to persons who have 
wage jobs. For those household members who do 
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not hold wage jobs, the marginal value of their 
time could be either higher or lower than the 
average measured wage for the group. Also, part 
of the interstate wage r ate variation is due to 
labor quality differences, e.g. to education and 
wage-work experience. Problems with quality dif-
ferences are made less serious when education is 
included as a separate explanatory variable and 
when observations are grouped by age before con-
structing variables. 
There is also the choice between measured 
and imputed average wage rates. A wage equation 
could be estimated, then imputed wage rates used 
as instrumental variables. Data on the charac-
teristics of only those household members who 
work at wage jobs do not exist. Furthermore, 
when wage functions are fit ted to the available 
data, the low R2's for aggregate data suggest 
that a relatively large amount of useful wage 
variation may be lost by using imputed wage 
rates. Thus off-farm wage rates for farm opera-
tors and for other farm household members are de-
rived as measured average wage rates. The two 
different farm family wage variables are used in 
an attempt to capture in the empirical analysis 
interdependencies in time allocation between 
operators and other household members . 
In addition to farm labor performed by other 
farm family members, hired farm labor is an im-
portant substitute in farm production for (much 
of) operator farm labor. This latter substitu-
tion possibility is incorporated into the empiri-
cal analysis through the wage rate for hired farm 
labor. The wage rate for hired farm labor is the 
state average daily wage rate, without board and 
room, for hired farm labor (USDA 1965). The 
problem of interstate wage variation because of 
labor quality differences is more serious for 
hired farm labor than for farm household labor 
because education of hired labor is not included 
in the analysis. 
In cross-sectional data there is little 
meaningful variation in farm output price(s) to 
explain shifts in the off-farm labor supply func-
tion; but there is large variation in farm output, 
and the size of farm output is extremely impor-
tant for determining the quantity of operator 
labor demanded for farm work. Thus in the empir-
ical analysis. farm output, measured as the value 
of farm products sold, replaces the farm output 
price as a shifter of the off-farm labor supply 
function. A potential deficiency of measured 
farm output is the simultaneous equation bias of 
its coefficient caused by the joint determination 
of actual farm output and hours of off-farm work. 
When more data are collected on the farm inputs, 
this problem can be resolved by using imputed 
output as an instrumental variable for farm out-
put . 
Other (nonwage and nonfarm) household income 
includes income received from nonfarm businesses 
and professions; social security, pensions, vet-
erans and welfare payments; and rent from farm 
and nonfarm property, interest and dividends. 
The variable has most of the usual deficiencies 
of such nonwage income variables . Some income 
components are contingent on household member's 
decisions about work. Other income components 
are a return to both labor and nonhuman capital. 
Current asset income is determined by oast 
saving, t01'e of investment and labor supply de-
cisions.1 These deficiencies of the other house-
hold income variable will cause its estimated co-
efficient to be biased. 
In addition to the effects of education on 
of f-farm labor supply through its effects on off-
fat"ID wage rates and on the level of farm produc-
:ion, education can affect off-farm labor supply 
through its effect on the efficiency of human 
time use in farm and household production and 
?erhaps on preferences about time allocation to 
different major activities . The education of 
fare operators and other household members is 
~asured as the average number of years of school-
ing completed by operators and by other farm 
r~usehold members 25 years of age and older, re-
s~eccively. Young children place restrictions on 
the allocation of time to different activities, 
especially for wives, and older household members 
tend to be quite income (or market goods) inten-
sive in their consumption. These family size and 
~omposi cion effects are expected to affect off-
farm labor supply. Thus two family size vari-
ables are derived, the number of children less 
than 5 years of age and the number of persons 5 
years of age and older.11 
Swmnary statistics for the variables of the 
sa::iple and for the five age groups are presented 
in table 1 . A comparison oi mean values of vari-
ables across age groups of farm operators shows · 
tha t farmers in the group 65 years of age and 
older possess extreme sample values. Also, re-
ti rei:ient decisions weigh heavily on behavior at 
this time . Thus the sample is made more homogen-
ous and compatable with the labor supply model by 
exclud ing the faro operators 65 years of age and 
~ver . The table also shows definite life-cycle 
pat terns for the CHILD and OFAM variables and a 
def inite "vintage" effect for the two education 
variables. 
The Econometric Model and the Empirical Results 
In the econometric model, different func-
tional forms are used to represent the relation-
ship between the two measures of off-farm labor 
supply and the explanatory variables. The logis-
tic functional form was chosen for the particioa-
tion rate equation after some experimentation:l2 
- a2X2i - 11i) J' 
2 
Eµi • O; Eµi • 
i,lj 
i=l, ... , 180; 
2 01 ; Eµiµj E 0, 
i.1\ere 1J 's are random disturbances that have an in-
cependent identical normal distribution with zero 
:::ean and common variance o 2. It is transformed 
into the logit function, w~ich is linear in the 
unknown coefficients and the disturbance, for es-
ti::lation: 
(11) lo[Ri/(l - Ri)] 2 a
0 
+ a 1lnX1i 
+ a2X2i + 11i" 
AlthOUgh the participation r ate Ri is bounded ~e-
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tween 0 and 1, the new dependent variable in 
equation (11), the natural logarithm of the odds 
in favor of off-farm work participation, is a 
monotone increasing function of Ri and is bound-
ed between± w, 13 In equation (11), a1 is an 
elasticity, the percentage change of the odds due 
to a 1 percent change of X1, and a 2 is the per-
centage change of the odds due to a marginal 
change in the level of x2 . 
A mixed geometric and exponential functional 
form was chosen for the days of off- farm work 
equation: 
(12) OF'DAYSi 
i•l, ... , 180; Eci = 0 ; 
2 2 
Eci = o2 ; &icj = 0, iii~. 
where ti 's are random disturbances assumed to 
have an independent and idential normal distribu-
tion with zero mean and common variance o~. The 
loge transformation is performed on equation (12) 
to obtain an equation that is linear in the un-
known coefficients and the disturbance: 
(13) ln(OFDAYS) • b0 + b1 lnXli +b 2X2i + ci . 
In (13) coefficient b1 is the elasticity of 
OFDAYS with respect to X1; b2 gives the percen-
tage change of OFDAYS due to a one unit change in 
the level of x2. The results from fitting the two off-farm 
supply functions, equations (11) and (13), to the 
180 observations by the method of classical least 
squares are reported in table 2.14 Regression 
equation (1) and (2) report results for the odds 
of participation equation . Variables that have 
small t-ratios in (1) were excluded from regres-
sion equation 2.15 
Both farm family wage variables have posi-
tive coefficients significantly different from 
zero. Since income effects of a wage rate change 
are zero when off-farm work is zero, the positive 
coeff i cient of the operators ' wage variable shows 
the effect of strong substitution effect s in pro-
duction and consumption causing a switch from 
zero to positive quantities of off-farm work. 
The positive coefficient for the other household 
members ' wage variable is surprising. Compen-
sated cross-wage effects between household mem-
bers on labor supply have been found to be quite 
small. The income effect is zero, so the explan-
ation must be that operator and other farm house-
hold farm labor are complements rather than sub-
stitutes in farm production. 
Although it was impossible to derive !_priori 
unambiguous expected effects of the hired farm 
labor wage rate and of farm output on the odds of 
off- farm work, the negative and statistically 
significant coefficients of these variables a re 
quite appealing . Increasing the wage r ate of 
hired labor, which increases the cost of hired 
labor relative to operat or farm labor (and other 
farm household member's farm labor) , causes a 
substitution of operator farm labor for hired 
farm labor given that farm output is held con-
stant and decreases the odds (probability) of 
operators ' off-farm work . The strong negative 
coefficient of farm output reflects the over-
Table 1. Sample Means for Whole Sample and for Different Age Groups of Farm Operators - U.S., 1964 
Sample 
Symbols Variable description (Age groups Age grou2s of farm 02erators 
<65 years) <35 yrs . 35- 44 45-54 55-64 ~65 
R Annual participation rate in 0.545 0.621 0.607 0.538 0.415 0.146 
off-farm work - farm operator (0.13)1 
(Regions :) Northeast 0.550 0.569 0.534 0.440 0.180 
North Central 0.568 0.534 0.471 0.354 0.128 
South 0.689 0.683 0.587 0.450 0.138 
West 0.632 0.608 0. 548 0.417 0.155 
OFDAYS Annual days of off-farm work 97.1 112.3 113 . 1 95.9 67.2 17.7 
- farm operator (da/yr) (35.8) 
(Regions:) Northeast 106.5 114. 7 104.5 78.9 22 . l 
North Central 86.6 84.5 70.5 47.2 14.9 
South 131 .4 134.4 109.0 75.0 16.4 
West 118.0 114.4 100.4 71.0 19.8 
WAGEF Off-farm wage rate - farm 18.9 19.2 19.6 18.8 17.8 15.6 
operator {$/da) (5.4) 
HA GEO Off-farm wage rate - other 14.6 15.9 13.8 14.2 14.6 15.0 
farm household members ($/da) (4. 6) 
WAG EH Farm wage rate for hired 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 
farm labor {$/da) (2 . 1) 
Q Value of farm products sold 15, 524.0 15,389.6 17,893.4 15, 921. 6 12,891.3 7,552.7 
($/yr) (12,479.1) 
01 Other realized household 1,031.0 782. 6 1,087.8 1,145.1 1,108.4 1,658.0 
income ($/yr) (393.1) 
EF Education - farm operator 10.1 11. 2 10.5 9.7 9.0 8.2 
(1. 4) 
EO Education - other adul t 10 . 6 11.l 10.8 10. 4 10.0 9.4 
household members (1. 0) 
CHILD Children < 5 years of age 0.41 1.00 0 . 45 0.14 0.07 0.04 
(0.39) 
OFAM Other family members (all 3.52 3.24 4 . 47 3.62 2.74 2.32 
persons ~ 5 yrs . of age) (0 . 68) 
1
standard deviations of variables ar e in parentheses . 
whelming effect of added farm output on added op-
erator farm labor demand when wage rates are held 
constant . This negative effect of added farm out-
put through farm operator labor demand outweighs 
any positive effect of added net farm income on 
total and off-farm labor supply of farm operators . 
Both education variables have coefficients 
significantly different from zero in regression 
equation (2), positive for operators' education 
and negative for education of other adult house-
hold members. Furthermore, the large size of the 
estimated coefficients implies that the odds of 
off-farm labor force participation are quite 
elastic to the direct effects of education. For 
88 
example , a 1-percent change of operators' educa-
tion causes a 5-percent change in the odds of 
operators' off-farm labor force participation. 
But this is not the full story for education. A 
change in the level of education can be expected 
to change the odds of off-farm work through its 
effects on wage rates and farm output. Since ed-
ucation is expected to have a positive effect on 
these variables, the education induced wage ef-
fects will be positive, and the farm output ef-
fects will be negative. 
The results show strong age and regional ef-
fects . The odds in favor of off-farm labor force 
participation are ceteris paribus lowest for the 
Table 2 . Estimates of Off-Farm Labor Supply Functions of U.S . Farm Operators: Odds of Participation 
and Days Worked - 1964 
Variables 
lo WAGEF 
lo WAGEO 
lo WAGEH 
ln Q 
lo 01 
lo EF 
lo EO 
CHILD 
OFAtt 
AGE DL11MIES2 
A3 (<35 yrs.) 
A3-4 (35-44 yr s.) 
A56 (55-64 yrs . ) 
REGIO~AL DUM!IIES 
~ortheas t 
South 
West 
Inter cept (Age 45-54 and 
North CencraJ region) 
ln[R/(1-R)) 
(1) ( 2) 
0.336 
(2.60) 
0.341 
(2 .63) 
-0.484 
(- 2. 56) 
-0.449 
(- 7.89) 
- 0 . 002 
(-0.02) 
5.727 
(6.49) 
- 2.782 
(- 2. 37) 
- 0 . 251 
(- 1. 26) 
0.479 
(4.68) 
0 . 076 
(0.34) 
- 0 .311 
(- 2.23) 
0 . 166 
(1. 36) 
0.073 
(0.97) 
0 . 701 
(7 . 02) 
Q.204 
(2.99) 
-4. 890 
(- 3.24) 
0.787 
(0 . 0751) 
0.336 
(2 . 67) 
0 . 360 
(2.82) 
- 0 . 496 
(- 2.63) 
-0. 451 
( - 8. 78) 
5 .898 
(6.78) 
-2.863 
(-2 . 44) 
o. soo 
(S.03) 
-0.151 
(-1. 60) 
- 0 . 417 
( - 3. 76) 
0.215 
(1. 86) 
0.061 
(0 . 81) 
0.735 
( 7. 77) 
0.202 
(3 . 01) 
-5 . 234 
( - 3. 56) 
0.784 
(0.0749) 
ln(OFDAYS) 
(3) (4) 
- 0.308 
(- 2.59) 
o. 637 
(5.32) 
- 0 . 375 
(- 2. 15) 
- 0.192 
(- 3. 66) 
0.097 
(1. 19) 
6 .157 
(7 .56) 
. 
-5.128 
(-4.73) 
0 .146 
(0.79) 
0 .397 
(4.21) 
- 0 . 396 
(- 2.08) 
- 0 . 414 
(- 3.22) 
o. 217 
(1. 92) 
0.302 
(4 . 31) 
0.655 
(7.11) 
0 . 337 
(S.34) 
1.869 
(1.34) 
0 . 720 
(0.0639) 
- 0 . 280 
(-2. 40) 
0 . 645 
(S . 48) 
-0.363 
(-2.08) 
- 0 . 165 
(-3.47) 
6.119 
(7 . 62) 
-5 . 082 
(-4.70) 
0.370 
(4.03) 
-0.315 
(- 3 . 60) 
-0.352 
(-3.44) 
0 .185 
(1. 73) 
0.300 
(4.34) 
0.655 
(7 . SO) 
0.350 
(S.63) 
2.254 
(1. 66) 
o. 716 
(0 . 0639) 
Note the observations a r e state averages per farm household for farm households grouped by age of 
!arm operator. There are four different age groups for each of 45 "states" and observations on all age 
groups are pooled t o make a t otal of 180 sample observations. 
1 t-ratios are in parentheses . 
2 Age and regional dummy variables take values of either 1 or 0. The reported intercept terms con-
tain estimates of the effects of being in the age group 45-54 and in the North Central region . The coef-
ficients of the du1111Dy variables estimates changes in the intercept d~e to age and regional effects. 
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3S-44 age group and highest for the SS-64 age 
group. The odds of participating for the less 
than 3S age group are higher than for the 3S- 44 
age group but lower than for the 4S- S4 age group, 
although not significantly so. The labor force 
participation differences by age are consistent 
with young farmers using off- farm work as a means 
of acquiring resources for getting started farm-
ing . 16 After age 4S, farmers start to exit farm-
ing or at least to diversify their allocation of 
working time. 
Regionally, farmers in the South and West 
have significantly larger odds of participating 
in off-farm work than do farmers in the North 
Central region.17 The odds of participating in 
the Northeastern region are also larger than in 
the North Central region, but this difference is 
not statistically significant. These regional 
differences undoubtedly reflect to some extent 
differences in the disequilibrium in farm labor 
markets during the late 19SO's and early 1960's. 
The Northeast and North Central regions exper-
ienced lower rates of farm population decline 
than did the South and West (Huffman 1977). 
Regression equations (3) and (4) report re-
sults from fitting equation (13) , the equation 
for operators off-farm work days. Variables that 
had small t-ratios in (3) were excluded from the 
variable list for estimating (4).18 The coeffi-
cient of the operators ' wage variable is negative 
in the off-farm days regression equations. This 
is opposite from its sign in the participation 
rate regression. This can, however, be explained 
by r ecognizing that the impact of operators' off-
farm wage rate on their days of off-farm work is 
determined by the difference between the wage 
rate's impact on their total work and on farm 
work. If the effect of WAGEF on total labor sup-
ply is sufficiently negative, then the days of 
off-farm work decline as WAGEF increases. 
The estimated elasticities for the wage var-
iables for other farm household members and for 
farm hired labor and for farm output and the co-
efficients of the two education variables have 
the same signs in the days regressions as in the 
participation rate regressions. Furthermore, the 
economic interpretation of the results is very 
similar, except that a larger income effect should 
be associated with WAGED since the quantity of 
off-farm work is positive. The family size and 
composition variables have similar effects on the 
two off-farm labor supply variables . In both the 
participation rate and off-farm days regressions, 
the coefficient of the CHILD variable is negative, 
but it is not significantly different from zero . 
This result is consistent with other labor supply 
studies where the number of young children has 
not had a significant effect on husbands' labor 
supply. In both the participation rate and the 
off-farm days regressions, the coefficient of the 
older family size variable is .positive and s ta-
tistically significant. The strong performance 
of OFAM suggests that it impacts on operators' 
total work and farm work in opposite directions 
so that they reinforce one another. 
The differential effects of age and geo-
graphic region on operators' off-farm days worked 
are quite similar to the age and regional differ-
ences on the odds of participation. 
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4. Implications 
The share of farm family income from non-
farm sources is about SO percent, and it has been 
increasing. This privately initiated type of 
diversification of sources of family income has 
reduced the vulnerability of farm family welfare 
to the wide swings in net farm income. The pro-
tection, however, is not equal across all farm 
sizes. If farm size is measured by sales and 
the dividing line between small and large farms 
in 197S is set at $10,000, the families that op-
erated small farms received 89 percent of their 
income from nonf arm sources and those that oper-
ated large farms received only 31 percent (USDA 
196S, p. 6S). Thus nonfarm income provides 
greater protection from wide swings in net farm 
income to the families operating small farms. 
Increasing nonfarm income has caused a dra-
matic rise in the level of income and the rela-
tive income position of families operating small 
farms. The index of prices received by farmers 
was approximately the same in 1960 and 196S, but 
it about doubled between 196S and 197S, so let a 
farm be defined as small in 1960 and 196S if it 
had sales of less than SS,000 and in 197S if it 
had sales of less than $10,000 . Between 1960 and 
196S, nonfarm income in 1967 cons tant dollars of 
these farmers increased by 68 percent (from 
$2,789 to $4,6S2), and between 196S and 197S the 
increase was 69 percent (to $7 ,862). Further-
more, this dramatic rise in nonfarm income of 
families operating small farms led to a sizable 
improvement in their relative income position. 
In 1960, the incomes of these families operating 
small farms was only SO percent as large as for 
families operating larger farms. In 197S, the 
percentage was 66 percent. Thus as agricultural 
policies for small farmers a re considered , they 
should be scrutinized to see if they encourage 
resource reallocation yielding a social rate of 
return that compares favorably with small farm 
families investing their capital and allocating 
their labor in nonfarm markets. 
New welfare policy could reduce the depen-
dence of poor farm families on non-farm income. 
In the Rural Income Maintenance Experiment, the 
farm families receiving transfers reduced their 
hours of off-farm work and increased their hours 
of farm work (U.S. Dep . Commerce 1976). Thus for 
these low income farm families, a negative income 
tax could reverse the trend toward greater depen-
dence on nonfarm income. 
The rising off-far m labor force participa-
tion of farm family members and an increasing 
share of supply elastic purchased inputs in farm 
production have increased the short-run elasti-
city of supply of farm output. The reason is 
that these people with off-farm jobs have low 
costs of adjusting labor supplies between farm 
and nonfarm labor markets. These farm families 
generally own unused farm machinery and building 
services and can respond quickly to changes in 
expected profitability of farming. This increas-
ing elasticity of farm output may become a burden, 
since small errors in setting government support 
prices for farm output can be quite costly to 
consumers and to taxpayers. 
Farm people who seek jobs in nonfarm labor 
markets have generally been disadvantaged by low 
l evels of education and few marke t able skills. 
Furthermore, with the large net migr ation out of 
agriculture that has occurred since 1950 many 
':ave experienced the effect of low nonfa;m labor 
market skills. Others have felt some of these 
e!fects as they looked for off- farm jobs. Thus 
~les and females who plan to enter farming 
should be encouraged to obtain training that 
ra ises their productivity of work at both farm 
and nonfarm jobs . Few farm families can expect 
:o be fully employed in agriculture. 
The study also says something about the po-
: en tial labor force that a new industry locating 
~n rural areas could expect to attract. Among 
:art:1ers, a disproportinately large number would 
be older than 45 years of age, have higher than 
average education levels, and have larger than 
average family sizes. Also , off- farm participa-
tion rates by fan:iers are higher in the South 
:han in other regions. This information could be 
co::bined with current demographic and other in-
:ormat ion to help new industries make projections 
of where they might obtain the largest rural 
laO<> r supplies. 
Footnotes 
*I wish to thank James Adams and Duane Harris 
fo r helpful comments on an earlier draft of this 
paper. Journal Paper No. J - 8958 of the Iowa Ag-
:iculture and Home Economics Experiment Station, 
A=.es, Iowa. Project 2078. 
l Personal income of the farm population re-
fers to income received by all persons living on 
!an:lS . It includes the families of hired farm 
~rkers who live on farms but it excludes farm 
O?erators and their families who have nonfarm 
:es i dences. Only since 1960 are data available 
on t he share of farm operator family income that 
is obtained from off- farm income. But this share 
shows the same increasing importance of nonf arm 
>ources. 
., 
~Income from nonf arm sources also includes 
"cofar::i business and professional income rents 
& • 
. ro::i. nonfarm real estate, dividends, interest, 
-~ecployment compensation and social security 
payments. 
3The other change is discussed in Huffman 
(197 /) . 
t. Occupation is determined by where the indi-
vidual spent the largest number of hours working 
~uring the census week. If he was unemployed, 
:he occupation is the las t one where the person 
•.:as employed. 
5 Throughout this paper , work, farm and non-
!arm, refers to the quantity of human time allo-
cated to these activities . The intensit y of ef-
fort is assumed to be constant. 
6 The level of the current wage rate is as-
StlCled to depend on the quantity of human capital 
accui:iulated during previous periods. Some of 
:his capital is, however , a result of previous 
10-0r k experience. 
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7 Nonmonetary aspects of jobs are not tract-
able with the available data. However, if the 
values of marginal net nonmonetary benefits at 
farm and off-farm work differ, the optional al-
location of time will change , and different mar-
ginal wage rates are required to equalize net 
advantage from the two types of work. 
8 For some household members, farm work may 
be a residual. This will occur if institutional 
factors set similar rig id requirements on the 
working hours . 
9 In aggregate average data, reporting errors 
for days worked by individuals should not cause 
serious spurious negative correlation between 
their wage rate and days of off-farm work because 
the reporting errors across individuals in a 
group should cancel out. It is possible, how-
ever, that the average number of hours worked per 
day of off-farm work differs across age groups of 
farm operators. This is a potential source of 
measurement errors in the wage variables. 
10 There are also problems with nonreporting 
and missreporting of this type income. 
11 Husbands and wives make decisions on family 
size; but in this study, the number of children 
is taken as exogenous to labor supply decisions . 
12 The choice was based upon goodness of fit 
to the sample obser vations and size of t - values 
of the estimated coefficients. 
13 Theil (p. 332) discusses advantages of a 
logistic specification over a linear probility 
model . 
14 One might expect the residual variance of 
the fitted functions to differ significantly by 
age group of farm operator . This would signal 
a violation of the Gauss - Markov assumption of 
homoscedastic disturbances and the need for ap-
plication of weighted least squares . The square 
roots of the residual variances for age groups 
<35, 35-44 , 45-54, and 55-64 for regression 
equation (1) are .294, .285, .224, and . 237 , re-
spectively, and for equation (3) are .273, . 242 , 
.192, and .251, respectively . Furthermore, ap-
plication of weighted least squares by using 
these values as weights changes the results very 
little. 
15 A test of the composite null hypothesis 
that the coefficients of lnOI and CHILD are 
jointly zero cannot be rejected at the 5- percent 
significance level. The calculated F-value is 
1.59, and the critical F- value at the 5- percent 
significance level and 2 and 164 degress of free-
dom is 19 . 49. 
16 Some of these young farmers may also be 
exiting from farming. 
17 White- nonwhite operator participation rate 
differences are reflected along with some other 
things in the coefficients of the regional dummy 
variables. In 1964, greater than 95 percent of 
the nonwhite farm operations in the United States 
lived in the South. 
18Given a calculated F-value of 1.87 for the 
composite hypothesis that the coefficients of 
lnOI and CHILD are both zero and a critical value 
of 19.49 for 2 and 164 degrees of freedom at the 
5-percent significant level, fhe null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. 
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